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No BLOOD FOR OIL? UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY,
OIL, AND THE ARCTIC WILDLIFE REFUGE
CHRISTOPHER R. CLEMENTS*
"I think this is very likely the environmentalfight of the decade. ,,
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 2003, "[s]everal million demonstrators took to the
streets [in major cities across] Europe and the rest of the world .... They
came together for one purpose, to protest the American-led war against Iraq.3
The protests were not limited to cities overseas, similar protests were held in
the United States in such places as Washington, D.C., New York, and San
Francisco.4 The protestors' signs and shouts conveyed many different
messages. Whether calling for a free Palestine or denouncing American
. Christopher Clements is a J.D. candidate attending the College of William and Mary School
of Law. He received a B.A. in Economics and Philosophy from the College of William and
Mary in 1997. He was commissioned as a Combat Engineer in the United States Army in
1997 and is an active duty Captain preparing to enter the Judge Advocate Corps. The views
of the author do not represent the views of the United States Army or the Department of
Defense.
' All Things Considered: Connection Between Debates over the Nation's Dependence on
Foreign Oil and Calls for Drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife (National Public Radio
broadcast, Nov. 5, 2001). This statement, it turns out, was an understatement. Allen Smith,
a leader in the Wilderness Society, made this assessment of the future of the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge ("ANWR") eleven years ago. A decade later the preservation of the ANWR
is still an environmental fight. His words, "[the struggle for conservation and development]
centers not only on the protection of one of the most unique places on the planet, the Arctic
Refuge, but it also centers on our whole being as a country and how we deal with energy
policy," still ring true. Id.
2 See Glen Frankel, Millions Worldwide Protest Iraq War, Coordinated Effort Yields Huge
Turnout in Europe, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at Al. "The largest rallies were [held] in
London, Rome, Berlin, and Paris.... [T]here were also protests in dozens of other cities
[around the world], from Canberra to Oslo and from Cape Town to Damascus.... " Id.
3Id.
" See Evelyn Nieves, Anti-War Protests Get Louder in California, WASH. POST, Oct. 14,
2002, at Al; Michael Powell, In New York, Thousands Protest a War Against Iraq, WASH.
POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at A22; Monte Reel & Manny Fernandez, Antiwar Protests Largest
Since '60s, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at Al.
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imperialism, however, one theme stood out in its regularity and consistency
across the protests.
From London to Bangkok, over the din of the multitudes, a clear,
repetitive chant could be heard: "NO BLOOD FOR OIL!"; "NO BLOOD
FOR OIL!"; "NO BLOOD FOR OIL!" The simple slogan underscores what
many throughout the globe believe was the true reason for America's war
with Iraq.5 Although the protesters spoke different languages, their message
remained the same: No blood for oil.
Oil is the lifeblood of America's economic and military power. It is not
hard to imagine American industry, commerce, and standards of living
coming to a crashing halt without a constant supply of oil. Statistics from the
Energy Information Administration ("EIA") show that the United States
consumes far more oil than any other country on the planet.6 In 2001, the
United States consumed 19.6 million barrels of oil per day, and it is projected
that by 2020, this number will increase to 27.1 million.7 The next closest
country, Japan, consumed 5.4 million barrels per day in 2001.8 Concurrently,
the United States produced only 9 million barrels of oil per day in 2001, and
is projected to produce 9.4 million barrels per day in 2020.' The difference
between the amount of oil America produces and the amount of oil America
demands is a growing source of concern for the United States government
and its national security strategy.
The argument is simple: oil is absolutely vital to American interests. 1
The United States uses more oil than it produces." It must therefore rely
' See Frankel, supra note 2, at A 1. Many protesters believe that oil interests dictate American
foreign policy. Speaking on the behalf of London protesters, London Mayor Ken Livingstone
said Bush was "a stooge for oil interests." Id. at A20.
6 The Energy Information Administration was created by Congress in 1977, and is an
independent statistical agency for the Department of Energy. The EIA is a nonpartisan
agency that provides data, forecasts and analyses to assist in making sound governmental
policy decisions. See Website for the Energy Information Administration, at ftp://ftp.eia.
doe.gov/pub/pdf/international/0484(2003).pdf.
'ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONALENERGY OUTLOOK 2003, at 185
(2003), available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/pdf/intemational/0484(2002).pdf. [hereinafter
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2003].
8Id.
9 1d. at 235.
"0 See Talk of the Nation: US. Dependence on Imported Oil and Its Effect on National
Security (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 6,2002) (quoting Senator Frank Murkowski,
"oil moves America; oil moves the world").
" See generally ENERGY OUTLOOK 2003, supra note 7, at 38-42.
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heavily on imported oil. A combination of necessity and the sheer volume of
imported oil renders the United States completely dependent on foreign oil. '
2
This dependency is an economic and military weakness because the United
States is, quite simply, vulnerable to the oil trade.' 3 This reality is the
Achilles' heel of the world's only superpower and mandates the requirement
for a reliable, uninterrupted supply of oil from foreign sources.
Exacerbating this vulnerability is the fact that a large percentage of the
world's oil reserves and oil production takes place in the Persian Gulf"' and
in other nations constituting the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries ("OPEC").' 5 Some of these nations historically have been anti-
American and many others are becoming increasingly hostile to American
interests. 6 The effect these countries' actions have on the world supply of oil
is critical to our foreign and domestic affairs.
The answers to American dependency on oil have taken several forms.
Proposals generally focus on the demand for oil, the supply of oil, or both. 7
In the last decade, a large number of politicians and lobbyists have identified
increasing the domestic supply of oil as the solution to the problem. 8 In
opposition, other politicians and groups of conservationists have complained
that domestic production and exploration of oil will inevitably lead to
destruction of the environment.' 9 Nowhere has this debate crystallized more
clearly than the fight over the future of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge("ANWR").
About one-sixth of the oil produced in the United States comes from the
vast oil fields in Alaska.2" Much of the land there and offshore have been or
12 Id.
" The crippling effects of the oil shocks in the 1970s and the anxiety caused by the Persian
Gulf War in 1990 demonstrate just how vulnerable the United States is due to the oil trade.
" The Persian Gulf nations ofOPEC include Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and United Arab Emirates.
" In addition to the Persian Gulf states, OPEC includes Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria
and Venezuela.
16 Iran and Iraq, for example, were named as part of the "Axis of Evil" by President George
W. Bush during the State of The Union Address in 2002. President George W. Bush, State
of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002
/01/20020129-11 .html.
'7 See infra Part V.
ISee infra Part V. A.
See infra Part V. B.
20 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2001, at 127(2002),
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are being tapped for their reserves, most notably Prudhoe Bay.2 The ANWR,
because of its refuge status,22 currently stands apart from the land being used
for oil production. In the face of ever increasing threats to American security,
and the susceptibility of the American economy to the oscillations of the oil
trade, should the ANWR remain untouched? In the balancing act between
environmental conservation and national security, the ANVWTR symbolizes
this struggle unlike any other issue.
While this struggle has persisted over several decades, American energy
and foreign policy have been dramatically transformed since September 11,
2001. Terrorists and rogue nation-states 23 have forced the United States to
take serious steps to secure its borders and its interests. The steps taken to
secure American interests against terrorists, some of whom were financed by
oil money,24 and rogue terrorist states, some of whom gain revenue from the
oil trade, 25 have brought the question of the ANWR's future to a critical
point. Should the United States choose conservation or exploitation, and what
impact will that choice have on national security?
History, and the events of September 11 th, have proven that there are
few interests greater than national security. This Note will argue, however,
that the interests of national security do not require opening the ANWR for
drilling. Despite the contentions of pro-drilling forces, environmental
interests outweigh the necessity to drill in the ANWR when there are more
effective, alternative measures to reduce American dependency on foreign
oil. Instead, the gravity of national security should force the United States to
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/petro.html [hereinafter ENERGY REVIEW
2001].
21 See M. LYNNE CORN ET AL., ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: THE NEXT CHAPTER,
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, CRS Doe. No. IB 10073 (2001),
available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/natural/nrgen-23.cfm.22 See Danny Eidson, Why Congress Should Grant Wilderness Status to the Coastal Plain of
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Part 1, 7 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 218 (1998) (referring to
the Refuge Recreation Act of 1962). The uses of wildlife refuge lands have been required to
"not materially interfere with or detract from the purpose(s) for which the refuge was
established." Id. (citation omitted). This precluded drilling for oil in the ANWR.
23 Rogue nation states include those in the Axis of Evil: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, as well as
nations that support terrorists. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 29, 2002), supra note 16.
24 See Gregg Easterbrook, Pumped Up: Why This War is also About Oil, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
8, 2001, at 15.
25 Id.
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find real, long-term solutions to its dependency on foreign oil. In the process,
Americans will have to answer difficult questions, and possibly make
sacrifices. Drilling for oil in the nation's only untouched arctic ecosystem
dodges those difficult questions and simply cannot permanently reduce
American oil dependency or strengthen its national security.
Part II of this Note examines the Bush Administration's National
Energy Policy and the Congressional actions to push through a comprehen-
sive energy law in 2001. Part III describes the connection between American
national security and the dependence on foreign oil. Part IV describes the
origin and legislative history of the ANWR. Part V discusses the debate be-
tween proponents of drilling and environmentalists as it relates to American
national security. In Part VI, this Note will argue that the paramount im-
portance of national security requires American policymakers and citizens
to choose a long-term solution to their oil dependency and forego drilling in
the ANWR. Part VII will draw a conclusion to this challenge of security in
opposition to the environment.
II. THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY
Popular sentiment over energy issues has waxed and waned over the
years.26 In the United States "[e]nergy policy-making . . . is a cyclical
enterprise. When energy prices rise rapidly because of limited supplies,
energy dominates the political agenda. When supplies are plentiful and prices
stable, it fades into the background. 2 7 In addition to fluctuating priorities,
energy issues have been difficult for the government to address because of
competing interests between the energy industry and environmental groups.2
These obstacles have caused previous administrations to struggle since the
early 1970s to create a workable national policy to address energy issues.2
In the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush did not directly
address energy issues.3" Energy supply and prices were stable at the time, and
" See All Things Considered, supra note 1.
27 Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U.
COLO. L. REv. 341, 341 (2002).
25 See id. at 341-42.
29See All Things Considered, supra note 1 (analyzing the connection between debates over
the nation's dependence on foreign oil and calls for drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge).
3 See Edward Walsh, Bush Tries Tested Themes to Regain Campaign Edge, WASH. POST,
2003]
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the primary issues included tax cuts, education and Medicare." It was not
until the California energy crisis captured the public's attention in 2001 that
President Bush made energy issues a priority for his administration.3 2 The
rolling blackouts on the West Coast soon dominated the political agenda,
forcing the Bush Administration to confront the difficult problem previous
administrations attempted to solve and failed.
A. History of Energy Policies
Energy security issues came to the forefront of American politics in
1973 during the Nixon administration, and continued to surface whenever
"oil prices spike[d] or American troops [were] sent overseas."33 In October
1973, OPEC colluded to enact the first Arab oil embargo.34 The embargo's
purpose was to punish countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur
War.35 When the embargo was lifted in early 1974, the price of oil rose
dramatically from $2 per barrel to more than $12 per barrel.36 The price hikes
resulted in higher prices for gasoline, rationing of gasoline and stagnation of
economic growth.37
In response, President Nixon created Project Independence on November
7, 1973, several weeks after the declaration of the OPEC oil embargo.38
Project Independence embodied the first real national energy plan. Its goal
was total energy self-sufficiency by 1980 through allocation of sources,
rationing of energy supplies, and construction of the Alaska Pipeline.39
Sept. 12, 2000, at A12; see also Bryner, supra note 27, at 343.
3" See Walsh, supra note 30.
32 See Mike Allen, California Power Parley; Energy Crisis Shadows Bush's Western Trip,
WASH. POST, May 28, 2001, at A l; see also Bryner, supra note 27, at 343.33 See All Things Considered, supra note 1. Those events are the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the
1979 overthrow of the Shah in Iran, and the 1990 Persian Gulf War.
14 DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPiC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 588-612
(1991).
35 Id.
36 1d. at 625.
37 Id. at 686-87, 717-18.
31 Project Independence: Hearing Before the House Comm. ofthe Interior & Insular Affairs,
93d Cong. 1 (Nov. 21, 1974) (opening statement of Honorable James Abourezk, Senator,
South Dakota); see generally Dep't of Energy, DOE Timeline: 1971-1980, at http://ma.mbe.
doe.gov/me70/history/1971-1980.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Timeline].39 Id. at 1-2.
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Additionally, the Nixon regime created the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and
the first set of national fuel economy standards.4" During Nixon's time in
office, the United States imported thirty-six percent of its oil.4"
President Carter sought to build on the initiatives begun by President
Nixon. On April 18, 1977, he announced an ambitious National Energy Plan
focusing attention on the consumption of oil by providing incentives for
conservation and alternate fuels.42 This conservation focus distinguished it
from Project Independence, which focused primarily on production. In 1979
the world's economies were hit by a second wave of oil shortages caused by
the overthrow of the Shah in Iran.43 When this second crisis hit, the United
States had increased its imports to forty-six percent of its oil consumption."
Following the embargo, President Carter proposed programs to increase and
develop solar power, as well as declaring a decade-long effort to enhance
production of synthetic fuels.45 None of these proposals were very successful
and the "gas crunch" that followed contributed to President Carter's loss to
Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election.'
The next oil crisis occurred in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.47 The
invasion rocked the world's oil trade, sending oil prices soaring and cut into
the supply of oil from the Middle East.4 8 The United States and the United
Nations responded to the invasion by massing forces in Saudi Arabia and
eventually liberating Kuwait.4 Months after the conflict was over, President
George H.W. Bush pushed for a national energy security strategy that
centered on expanding domestic production, namely drilling in the Arctic
" See All Things Considered, supra note 1.
41 Id.
42 See Timeline, supra note 38.
43 See YERGIN, supra note 34, at 674-98.
14 See All Things Considered, supra note 1.
45 Id.
46 See Calvin Woodward, Efficiency, Not Austerity; Administration Rejects Carter-Era
Sacrifices, Suggesting Common-Sense, HOUSTON CHRON., May 20, 2001, at Business 6.
41 See Douglas S. Sandhaus, Should Congress Open Up the Alaskan Coastal Plain to Oil
Exploration? A Discussion of Options, 2 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 43, 48 (1992).
41 See Arnold Nadler, Iraq Shatters Some Myths About Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990, at
13.
41 See Nora Boustany, Baghdad Radio Says Troops Are Ordered to Pull Out of Kuwait,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1991, at A6.
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National Wildlife Refuge, but gave conservation of energy very little
attention. 50
In the years between the oil crises, administrations made little effort to
address national energy security issues. Notably, President Reagan iden-
tified the nation's increasing dependence on foreign oil in his 1987 Energy
Security Report.5 In the 1990s, the Clinton Administration failed to produce
a national energy policy but did make an attempt to tax energy use.52 The two
administrations were characterized by a period of economic growth and
stable energy prices and supply, factors that made energy security less visible
or important.53
Today, thirty years after the nation's first cohesive energy strategy, the
United States has become ever more dependent on foreign oil with imports
measuring sixty percent of its total consumption.54
B. The National Energy Policy Development Group Report
In his second week in office, President George W. Bush charged Vice
President Richard Cheney with establishing the National Energy Policy
Development Group ("NEPDG"), "directing it to 'develop a national energy
policy designed to help the private sector, and, as necessary and appropriate,
State and local governments, promote dependable, affordable, and environ-
mentally sound production and distribution of energy for the future."' 55 The
group's efforts were intensified when, in March 2001, President Bush stated
that the United States was "now in an energy crisis."56 President Bush warned
that the crisis could spread to other states, and that the United States needed
to explore for more oil in Alaska and the ANWRY On May 17, 2001, the
5oSee All Things Considered, supra note 1.
s' See Timeline supra note 38.
See Bob Minzesheimer & Mark Memmott, Bentsen: Energy Tax Likely, USA TODAY, Jan.
25, 1993, at IA.
" See Bryner, supra note 27, at 34 1.
14 See generally, ENERGY REVIEW 2001, supra note 20 (describing the state of the United
State's oil demand and production).
15 NAT'L ENERGY POL'Y DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE,
AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE, at viii (2001), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy [hereinafter NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY].
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Bush Administration unveiled the plan created by NEPDG.58 Soon thereafter,
President George W. Bush formally endorsed the new national energy policy
when he sent the proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2002 to Congress.59
The report formulated by NEPDG began by stating:
America in the year 2001 faces the most serious energy
shortage since the oil embargoes of the 1970s. The effects are
already being felt nationwide.... A fundamental imbalance
between supply and demand defines our nation's energy
crisis. . . .This imbalance, if allowed to continue, will
inevitably undermine our economy, our standard of living,
and our national security.60
To meet the challenges presented by the growing population and
expanding economy, the report called for "promoting energy conservation,
repairing and modernizing our energy infrastructure, and increasing our
energy supplies in ways that protect and improve the environment."6' The
report contained "105 specific recommendations, including forty-two
suggestions for policies to promote conservation, efficiency, and renewable
energy sources, and thirty-five that deal with expanding supplies of fossil
fuels. ' 62 The emphasis, however, was clearly on "opening new lands for
exploration, streamlining the permitting process, easing regulatory require-
5 See Dana Milbank & Eric Pianin, White House Outlines New Energy Policy; Focus
Remains on Production; Congressional Battle Expected, WASH.POST, May 17,2001, at Al;
see also Bryner, supra note 27, at 343.
" See Bryner, supra note 27, at 344.
60 NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 55, at viii. The report, after identifying the gravity
of the crisis that faces the nation, went on to say:
[I]t is not beyond our power to correct. America leads the world in
scientific achievement, technical skill, and entrepreneurial drive. Within
our country are abundant natural resources, unrivaled technology, and
unlimited human creativity. With forward-looking leadership and sensible
policies, we can meet our future energy demands and promote energy
conservation, and do so in environmentally responsible ways that set a
standard for the world.
Id. at viii, ix (emphasis added).
6' See id. at ix (emphasis added).
62 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 346-47.
2003]
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ments, and enlarging the nation's energy infrastructure."63 While advocates
of drilling cheered the plan, opponents, mainly democrats and environmental
groups, were less than enthusiastic.64
The opponents of President Bush's plan felt it was far too devoted to
increasing domestic energy supply, and neglected conservation and alternate
fuels.65 Additionally, opponents were concerned with the composition of the
development group and on what information they relied in forming the
plan.6 6 Working contrary to the environmentalists' efforts, the energy in-
dustry lobbied strenuously for increasing energy production, with oil
companies steadfastly defending the presumption that the decrease in the
supply of fossil fuels was the key problem.67 The emphasis on expansion
of domestic oil production is plainly visible in the central and most contro-
63 Id. President George W. Bush began with issuing executive orders to federal agencies to
expedite permits but some of the proposals require further congressional action.
Congressional spokespersons said that about eighty percent of the recommendations can be
handled by the executive and the remaining twenty percent would fall to legislative control.
An executive official acknowledged that the recommendations emphasized the expansion of
domestic energy supply. See Milbank, supra note 58.
6 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 348-51; see also Milbank, supra note 58 (reporting that
Democrats and environmental groups are gearing up for a major assault on the plan);
Intemet News Release, President's Energy Policy Makes All the Wrong Choices, (May 17,
2001), available at http://www.sierraclub.org, http://www.alaskawild.org, http://www.akcf.
org/savethearctic.htm, and http://www.protectthearctic.com. These websites belong to en-
vironmental groups dedicated to protecting the Arctic Refuge.
61 See id.
66 See Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, Cheney 's Role Offers Strengths And Liabilities, WASH.
POST, May 17, 2001, at Al. Many of the criticisms of the unveiled plan centered on Vice
President Cheney himself and the method he used to develop the plan. Democrats charged
the Vice President with a conflict of interest based on his chairmanship of Halliburton Co.,
an energy service firm, and his extensive relationship with the nation's various energy firms.
Further aggravating the anti-drilling coalition, the Vice President met personally with energy
industry leaders but used aides to speak with environmentalists. Id.
The General Accounting Office ("GAO") filed suit against Vice President Cheney. The
GAO sought to compel Cheney to divulge the composition of the energy development group
and other information used by the group. A federal judge threw out the case on the grounds
that the GAO lacked standing. The GAO has since decided that an appeal would be too
costly and time-consuming and has chosen not to continue the issue. See Adam Clymer,
Judge Says Cheney Needn't Give Energy Policy Records to Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2002, at Al.
67 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 349. In addition, see the ANWR Website, at http://www.
anwr.org, for a more detailed account of support for increasing domestic energy supply.
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versial aspect of the plan--drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge.
C. National Energy Policy and the ANWR
One of the major recommendations in the report was opening a portion
of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for oil exploration and drilling.6 In
its National Energy Policy, "[t]he NEPD Group recommend[ed] that the
President direct the Secretary of the Interior to work with Congress to
authorize exploration and, if resources are discovered, development of the
1002 Area of ANWR." 69 Once the President submitted the energy plan to the
legislature, it soon became apparent that the most difficult fight would be
over this provision.70
The 107th Congress hotly debated the merits of the energy plan and
introduced a total of six bills that directly affected the future of the ANWR.7'
In Congress, the leading advocates for opening the ANWR to oil explor-
ation were Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK), chairman of the Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, and Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), chairman
of the Appropriations Committee.72 Senator Murkowski sponsored a bill on
Feb. 26, 2001 that contained many of the measures under discussion in the
NEDPG, including opening the ANWR for exploration and drilling. 73 Senator
Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) countered with
bills aimed at conservation, renewable resources and increased energy
efficiency.74 Two other bills were submitted by Democrats in the House and
68 NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 55, at 5-10.
69 Id. The "1002 Area" refers to a small part of the ANWR along the Arctic Coastal Plain.
It is in this area where the greatest prospect for untapped oil lies. Id.
70 See generally, Milbank, supra note 58.
71 M. LYNNE CORN ET AL., ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR): CONTROVERSIES
FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF FOR
CONGRESS, CRS Doc. No. IB 10111 (2003), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/
crsreports/03Feb/IB 1011 .pdf (last updated Jan. 17, 2003).
72 Both Senators have regularly sponsored legislation allowing oil exploration in the ANWR.
Senator Frank Murkowski was replaced by Senator Lisa Murkowski in December 2002, who
continues his advocacy of drilling. See United States Senate Website, About Lisa at
http://Murkowski.senate.gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
7 National Energy Security Act of 2001, S. 389, 107th Cong. (2001); Bryner, supra note 27,
at 352.
"4 Energy Security and Tax Incentive Policy Act of 2001, S. 596, 107th Cong. (2001);
2003]
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the Senate that would have designated the ANWR a wilderness area, and
would have prevented any oil future exploration.75 In July 2001, the House
passed the Securing America's Future Energy Act of 2001 which contained
language opening the ANWR for drilling.7 6 The Senate took up the bill in
early August, with democratic senators warning that the provision for drilling
in the ANWR would be "dead on arrival" and would not be included in their
version.77 Then, on September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon.7
8
The Senate postponed debate on the national energy bill in the wake of
the turmoil caused by the terrorist attacks, and focused instead on passing
immediate national security measures.79 By December, the debate over the
national energy policy had resumed and Senate Democrats introduced an en-
ergy bill that placed an emphasis on energy conservation and blocked any ex-
ploration of the ANWR.' The debate over energy policy, however, had been
changed by the events of September 11 th.8' The terrorist attacks prompted
President Bush to urge Congress to pass legislation opening the ANWR in
the interests of promoting national security.82 The relationship between
national security and energy interests sparked renewed emphasis in the
administration and Congress to open the ANWR for oil drilling, and have
polarized the issue into one of national security.83
Comprehensive and Balanced Energy Policy Act of 2001, S. 597, 107th Cong. (2001);
Bryner, supra note 27, at 352-53.
71 Morris K. Udall Arctic Wilderness Act of 2001, H.R. 770, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 411,
107th Cong. (2001); see Eidson, supra note 22, for a more detailed discussion of proposals
to designate the ANWR as a wilderness area.
76 Securing America's Future Energy Act of 2001, H.R. 4, 107th Cong. (2001).
77 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 355.7
1 See Serge Schmemann, U.S. A TTACKED: President Vows to Exact Punishmentfor 'Evil,'
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
79 See e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
80 Energy Policy Act of 2002, S. 1766, 107th Cong. (2001).
SI See Talk of the Nation, supra note 10. Host Neal Conan commented:
If we needed another lesson, September the 11 th vividly illustrated this
country's dependence on imported oil, a fact that deeply affects foreign
and military policies.... Suddenly, the goal of energy independence is on
the front burner.
Id.
82 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 357, 362.
93 Id.
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III. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND OIL
The American war on terrorism and the war in Iraq have generated
considerable apprehension among America, its allies and the Arab world.84
There is little doubt that American post-September 11 th foreign and military
policy has caused a great deal of conflict with the rest of the international
community.85 As the rift between the United States and Arab countries
widens, the relationship between oil and security is becoming more important
than ever, and its impact on American foreign and domestic policies is
intensifying.
Arab leaders have recognized for some time now that oil is an inherent
weakness of Western industrialized nations, and that the supply of oil could
be used as a weapon. 6 Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, first
recognized the potential power of the Arab countries:
Nasser, too, wished to carve out a great empire, and in his
book, he emphasized that the Arab world should use the
power that came with the control over petroleum - "the vital
nerve of civilization"-- in its struggle against "imperialism."
Without petroleum, Nasser proclaimed, all the machines and
tools of the industrial world are "mere pieces of iron, rusty,
motionless, and lifeless." 7
Arab countries quickly embraced this strategy, resulting in the oil
embargoes of 1973 and 1979.8 More recently, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein
called on Arab states to deny oil exports to the United States and Israel.89
Hussein specifically referred to the use of oil as a weapon,"[i]f oil is not a
" See Donald 0. Mayer, Corporate Governance in the Cause of Peace: An Environmental
Perspective, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 585, 635-40 (2002) (referring to a "clash of
civilizations" (quoting SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CMLIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996))).
5 Id.
86 See YERGIN, supra note 34, at 593.
87 Mayer, supra note 84, at 635 (quoting YERGN, supra note 34, at 487).
See generally YERGIN, supra note 34 (describing the modem history ofoil producing states
in the Middle East).
" See Roula Khalaf et al., Iraq Reprisal Threatens Oil Markets Saddam Halts Exports Until
Israeli Forces 'Have Unconditionally Withdrawn From The Palestinian Territories,' FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2002, at 1.
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weapon while we have it, what else can we use to face the ambitious
powers?" '9 Faced with such a weapon, the United States must take measures
to protect itself. Effectively disarming the Arab "oil weapon" and protecting
American national security makes it vital to reduce the American dependence
on oil.
The Bush Administration released the National Security Strategy of the
United States of America in September 2002."' The Strategy outlined
America's long-term strategy for national defense in military, economic and
diplomatic language.92 It singled out the dangers terrorists and rogue states
pose to the well-being of the United States.93 One of the most controversial
aspects of the strategy was its endorsement of preemptive action.94 Among
its many proposals, the Strategy outlined principles for simultaneously
protecting the environment and enhancing energy security."' While the
strategy referred to energy and the environment in broad terms, it specified
expanding energy supplies in an environmentally safe way, "promot[ing]
renewable energy production," and improving fuel economy for vehicles. 96
These were not entirely new ideas. The groundwork for this portion of
the National Security Strategy was initially laid out by the Bush Ad-
ministration in its National Energy Policy.97 The Policy's language supported
the Security Strategy by noting that as America imports more oil it will
become increasingly more dependent on countries that have anti-American
interests.9" A major thrust of the Energy Policy concerns national security
and stresses that "[e]nergy security must be a priority of U.S. trade and
90 Iraq: No More Oil, CBS NEWS.COM, Apr. 22,2002, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2002/04/22/world/main506885.shtm (quoting Saddarn Hussein). Saddam Hussein
also said that Arab countries "should use oil as a companion weapon and not as [alternatives]
to other weapons." Hussein then went on to chastise the Saudis for saying that "oil was not
a tank or a plane to be used as a weapon." Id.
9 See generally President George W. Bush, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.
htm/ [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
92 Id.
93 Id. at 5-7.
94 Id. at 15-16 ("To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States
will, if necessary, act preemptively."). The invasion of Iraq in late March 2003 exemplified
the doctrine of preemption.
9' Id. at 19-20.96 Id. at 20.
97 See NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 55, at x, xv.
98 Id.
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foreign policy."99 These two documents explain the Bush Administration's
emphasis on energy security, national security and the oil trade.
The link between the supply of oil and national security has been made
in the past. Prior to the emergence of the National Security Strategy,
legislators wrestled with the issue of oil dependency and its effect on national
security. Senator Frank Murkowski, a longtime advocate of opening the
ANWR for oil drilling, voiced his concern for national security by saying:
[o]ur nation is being held hostage by the Mideast, which is
the supplier of the oil that we've become addicted to.... We
have an opportunity to open up a portion of the Coastal Plain
. . . [b]y bringing Alaska crude and gas to market, we will
reduce our dependence on foreign oil and the associated
threats to our national security.'°
Legislators, Democrats and Republicans alike, recognize that national
security isjeopardized by dependence on foreign oil. '' Representative Henry
Hyde (R-IL) noted that "our energy security is inextricably linked with the
political and economic security of our suppliers,"'0 2 and Representative Tom
Lantos (D-CA) remarked that "our dependence on Middle East oil severely
undermines our ability to combat international terrorism."' 3 Executive
officials have drawn attention to the relationship between dependency and
security as well."°
There is no question that American dependence on imported oil
constitutes a threat to our national security. 5 However, the consensus that
9 Id. at xv.
10" See For the Record, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2000, at A28 (remarks by Senator Frank
Murkowski at the National Press Club).
ol" See Oil Diplomacy: Facts and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency: Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. (June 20, 2002) [hereinafter Facts and
Myths].
102 Id. at 1.
103 Id. at 3.
104 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 362. Speaking at a meeting of oil producers, Secretary of
the Interior Gale Norton commented that in 2001, "the United States import[ed] 700,000
barrels of oil a day from Iraq and that 'it's time to start investing that money in our own
backyard and not in the back pocket of Saddam Hussein."' Id. (quoting Brad Knickerbocker,
New Push to Pump Oilfrom Alaska Refuge, CHRISTIAN SCi MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2001).
oS See All Things Considered, supra note 1 (replaying speech by President Bush where he
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the supply of oil and our nation's security are inextricably linked does not
provide an agreed solution. The solutions offered by the National Energy
Policy beg the question: Will drilling for oil in the ANWR improve
American national security?
IV. THE ANWR
The focal point of the political storm is the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, an area that "contains the last intact arctic ecosystem in the United
States, and possibly the world."'" Most of the approximately 1,200 miles of
Alaskan coastline is being developed by the oil industry. 07 What has not
been developed lies within the Refuge, an area of coastline measuring about
125 miles. 8 Within the Refuge itself lies a narrow portion of coastline
known as the Arctic Refuge Coastal Plain."°9 While the remainder of the
ANWR enjoys the status of "wilderness," the Coastal Plain does not."0
The Coastal Plain and the remainder of the Refuge have been called the
"American Serengeti" because they are home to a wide variety of plants and
animals."' Animals such as squirrels, bears, rabbits, foxes, wolves, moose,
deer, caribou, muskoxen, Dall sheep, fish, seals, whales and a variety of birds
live in the ANWR."' Plants ranging from mosses to shrubs and wildflowers
cover the Refuge." 3 This diversity and the Refuge's pristine condition have
led to the proposal that the Refuge and two neighboring parks in Canada be
made into an international park, and several species found in the area be
protected by international treaties or agreements." 4
stated, "Our country needs greater energy independence .... This issue is a matter of national
security"); Bryner, supra note 27, at 364-66; Mayer, supra note 84, at 615.
" See Eidson, supra note 22, at 210.
10 7 Id.
108 Id.
"o Id. The Arctic Refuge Coastal Plain measures about 108 miles long, extending inland only
twenty miles at the widest point. Id.
"
0 1d.
.. Eidson, supra note 22, at 209; see CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 1.
" 
2 See Fish & Wildlife Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Website, at http://www.r7.fws.gov/
nwr/arctic/descrip.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2003) (describing the ANWR).
113 Id.
"" See CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 1.
[Vol. 28:87
No BLOOD FOR OIL?
A. The Creation of the ANWR
The earliest efforts to protect the area of Alaska known today as the
ANWR began in the early 1950s.1"s The National Park Service ("NPS") sent
personnel to Northeast Alaska in 1952 to look for potential preservation
areas." 6 George Collins, the biologist responsible for surveying the area,
reported back to the NPS that "[the ANWR was] the finest national park
prospect I have seen. ' 17 In 1957, the Department of the Interior issued
guidelines for the reservations of public land within Alaska. "8 By November
that year, the Fish and Wildlife Bureau applied for withdrawal of the land in
the Arctic Refuge." 9 The Bureau cited the area's ecologically diverse flora
and fauna and requested federal protection for over 6.4 million acres of land
near the coastline. 2 ' The Secretary of the Interior took no action on the
application until 1960. 2 In the meantime, the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958
was enacted. 22 It incorporated Alaska into the Union and granted nearly
thirty percent of the existing public land in the territory to Alaska.2 3 Two
years later, on December 6, 1960, the Secretary of the Interior, Fred A.
Seaton, declared that approximately 8.9 million acres of land in northeastern
Alaska would be established as the Arctic National Wildlife Range, in order
"' See Sheila Weigert, Note, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over Drilling
in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, The Environment is the Only True Loser, 8 ENVTL. L. 169,
170 (2001).
116 See Eidson, supra note 22, at 211.
'
7 Id. (citations omitted).
"
8 See Todd Grover, Note, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution ofUnited States
v. Alaska, 28 ENVTL. L. 1169, 1172 (1998).
'
9 Id. at 1171-73. "The statutory and administrative law surrounding the creation of ANWR
is a confused mess." Id. at 1171. The regulations promulgated by the Department of the
Interior in 1957 allowed for agencies within the Department to petition the Secretary for
withdrawal of public lands by filing an application for withdrawal. When the Secretary
received the application, the regulations stated that the reserved land would be "'temporarily
segregate[d]' pending a final withdrawal decision." This had an important consequence:
when Alaska filed for statehood in 1958, the "temporarily segregated" land reserved by the
Fish and Wildlife Bureau did not revert to state control. Id. at 1172 (citations omitted).
0 Id. at 1171-73.
1Id. at 1173.
m Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508,72 Stat. 339 (1958); see Grover, supra
note 118, at 1173.
"' Alaska Statehood Act § 6, 72 Stat. at 340-43; see Grover, supra note 118, at 1173.
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,,124to preserve its "unique wildlife, wilderness and recreational values ....
The predecessor of today's ANWR was born.
B. The Legislative History of the ANWR
The withdrawal of the arctic coastal plain by the federal government
merely cemented what was already existing in Alaska in practice. 25 This
indifference soon changed when oil was discovered in nearby Prudhoe Bay
in 1968.126 By the late 1970s, the boom in arctic oil exploration had reached
a point where Congress was compelled to reevaluate the immediate future of
federally owned lands on the Alaskan coast.'27 Recognizing that "[s]ince its
establishment in 1960 ... the Arctic Range did not encompass the entire
ecological unit necessary to protect the habitats of notable wildlife
populations of this portion of the Arctic,"' 28 Congress responded by enacting
the AlaskaNational Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA") in 1980.129
The passage of ANILCA was the product of seven years of intense
debate in Congress revolving around its potential for gas and oil deposits. 30
The passage of ANILCA did several things. First, it gave the Arctic Range
124 Public Land Order 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598, 12,598 (Dec. 8, 1960). President
Eisenhower initially submitted an Arctic Range Wilderness Bill to Congress, but when the
Senate failed to act, Eisenhower used his executive authority to protect the area. See Energy
Security Act of 2001 Hearing on H.R. 2436 Before the House Comm. on Res., 107th Cong.
80-90 (2001) (statement of Adam Kolton, Arctic Campaign Director, Alaska Wilderness
League); see also Grover, supra note 118, at 1175.
125 See Grover, supra note 118, at 1175. The land withdrawn by the Department of Interior
was already considered federal land by the Alaskan government and the withdrawal itself
came as no surprise.
1261 d. (noting that "the Atlantic-Richfield Company discovered 9.8 billion barrels of oil just
west of the Refuge at Prudhoe Bay").
127 Id.
128 S. REP. No. 96-413, at 179-80 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070,5123-24; see
Eidson, supra note 22, at 212.
'29 See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 ("ANILCA"), Pub. L. No.
96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (1980)).
130 See Eidson, supra note 22, at 212. The possibility that more oil fields, similar to the one
discovered at Prudhoe Bay, might be beneath the Arctic Range drove the political
compromise that left the 1002 Area of the Coastal Plain without wilderness designation. The
1002 Area was considered by the oil industry to have the most potential for oil deposits. This
was also the area considered by environmentalists to be the "biological heart" of the range.
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"Refuge" status and increased its size to nearly 19 million acres.' 31 Second,
the Act expressly forbade any oil exploration in the newly created Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge without congressional approval. 3 2 Lastly, in a
measure of political compromise, it sectioned off a portion of the Coastal
Plain for further studies to determine what oil resources, if any, were present
and directed an environmental impact survey contemplating the effects of oil
drilling in that area. 133 This portion of the Coastal Plain would become
known as the "1002 Area." The language of section 1002 of ANILCA
allowed:
assessment[s] of the fish and wildlife resources of the coastal
plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; an analysis of
the impacts of oil and gas exploration, development, and
production, and to authorize exploratory activity within the
coastal plain in a manner that avoids significant adverse
effects on the fish and wildlife and other resources.' 34
The Act thus failed to provide wilderness status to the 1002 Area and
postponed the debate until further information could be obtained.
Seven years later, the Department of the Interior returned its Final
Legislative Impact Statement. In it, Department of the Interior Secretary
Donald Paul Hodel recommended that Congress allow exploration of oil in
the 1002 Area.' 35 The Impact Statement addressed the environmental impact
131 See ANILCA § 303(2)(A); see also Grover, supra note 118, at 1176. "Refuge" status is
defined by the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. §
668dd) and accordingly, with respect to each refuge, the Secretary of the Interior may not
permit any use, or grant easements for any purpose not compatible with the purposes for
which the refuge was established.
132 ANILCA § 1003.
'" See id. § 1002. This area, which comprises 1.55 million acres or approximately sevety-
five percent of the Coastal Plain, is frequently referred to as the 1002 Area. It represents
about seven percent of the total area of the ANWR. See Eidson, supra note 22, at 213.
'34 See ANILCA § 1002(a).
'3 See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGE, ALASKA, COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FINAL LEGISLATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1987), available at http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/
ANWR_ coastalLEIS.pdf.[hereinafler LEIS]. The study was a result of nearly sixty
individual field studies conducted between 1981 and 1985. See also Grover, supra note 118,
at 1176-77.
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of oil exploration and came to the conclusion that any impact would be
minimal.'36 Although some conservationists seized the study results as proof
that oil development would have a negative impact on the environment, the
study offered support to both sides of the argument'3 7 and gave the Reagan
Administration and Senate Republicans momentum in their endeavor to open
the ANWR to drilling. 8 Just when it looked as if they would succeed,
disaster struck-literally.
In March 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on a
submerged reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound, spilling an estimated
eleven million barrels of crude oil into the sea.'39 It was the largest tanker
spill in American history, and its devastating effects upon the wildlife and
ecology quickly halted the momentum of the drilling advocates. 4 Op-
position to developing oil fields in the ANWR mounted as public knowledge
136 See LEIS, supra note 135, at VII.
Potential [environmental] impacts were assessed for exploration,
development drilling, and production. Impacts predicted for exploration
and development drilling were minor or negligible on all wildlife
resources on the 1002 area. Production of oil is expected to directly affect
only 12,650 acres or 0.8 percent of the 1002 area. Consequences on
species such as brown bears, snow geese, wolves, moose, and the Central
Arctic caribou herd are expected to be negligible, minor, or moderate.
Id.
' See LEIS, supra note 135. The study contained evidence that the fragile ecosystems in the
1002 Area would be adversely affected by opening the area to oil exploration. The greatest
concern was for the potential major effects on the Porcupine caribou herd and the area's
muskoxen. Both animals faced possible displacement of their habitat and reduction in herd
sizes. However, the study concluded that the danger was not great enough to warrant a
prohibition on drilling.
3' See, e.g., Arctic Coastal Plain Leasing Act of 1987, H.R. 49, 101st Cong. (1989); Arctic
Coastal Plain Competitive Oil and Gas Leasing Act, S. 2214, 100th Cong. (1988) (sponsored
by Senator Johnston (R-LA)); Arctic Coastal Plain Public Lands Leasing Act of 1987, S.
1217, 100th Cong. (1987) (sponsored by Senator Frank Murkowski).
"3 See generally JOHN KEEBLE, OUT OF THE CHANNEL: THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL IN
PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND (1999) (describing the disaster and its aftermath).
"
4
' See Jim Greenhill, Exxon Spill Caused Record Bird Kill, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 1993, at
3A (noting the 1989 Valdez spill "killed 10 times more birds than any [other] spill in
history"); Jay Mathews, In the Last Year, Exxon Valdez Spill Was Only Tip Of Iceberg,
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1990, at A6 (reporting "[tihe incident has helped to delay federal
approval of oil drilling in some offshore and wildlife refuge areas, particularly the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge").
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of the damage from the Exxon Valdez disaster grew.' For the time being,
Congress shelved plans for drilling in the ANWR.
Pro-development legislators waited for another couple of years before
attempting to open the ANWR for drilling by attaching a rider to the 1995
budget that would authorize oil development. 4 2 President Clinton vetoed the
bill 4 3 in December 1995,44 primarily because of the inclusion of the budget
rider. 145 From 1996 to 2000, while several bills were introduced in both the
Senate and House dealing with the ANWR issue, none were seriously
debated, and no action was taken.
46
With no progress being made through federal legislation, state officials
in Alaska attempted to open the ANWR for drilling themselves, and brought
a lawsuit in 1996 against the federal government to force action. 1"' The legal
contest began with the apportionment of federal lands to Alaska when it
became a state in 1958.148 With both the Alaskan and federal government
disagreeing over the ownership of land located in the ANWR, Alaska turned
to the courts to settle the conflict. 49 The scope of the lawsuit extended back
to 1979 when the federal government filed an original action in the Supreme
Court to determine to whom the various submerged lands off Alaska's arctic
coast belonged. 5 ' Alaska responded by filing a counter claim seeking quiet
claim to the submerged lands within the ANWR.'5 The Supreme Court
appointed a Special Master to examine the facts and recommend a decision
to the Court.'52 The Special Master heard six years of testimony and delib-
erated for ten years before returning a recommendation to the Court in April
1996.153 Alaska took exception to the final report and brought the matter to
the Supreme Court.
5 4
.4' See Matthews, supra note 140, at A6.
142 See Eidson, supra note 22, at 214-16.
143 FY 1996 Budget Reconciliation Bill, H.R. 2491, §§ 5312-5344 104th Congress (1995).
4 See Eidson, supra note 22, at 214-16.
141 See CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 2.
146 Id. at 3.
147 United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997).
148 See Grover, supra note 118, at 1173-74.
149 Id.
'
0 See Alaska, 521 U.S. at 4.
151 Id.
152 Id.
'53 See Grover, supra note 118, at 1178.
114 See Alaska, 521 U.S. at 6.
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In a majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court
ruled against Alaska on the grounds that the Alaska Statehood Act reflected
a clear intent to defeat state title to all lands within the reserve [ANWR] and
the 1957 withdrawal of federal land from Alaska encompassed submerged
land."'55 The Supreme Court holding ensured that the decision to open up the
ANWR would be made at the national level, and not by the state of Alaska.
A major turning point in the debate came in 1998 when the United
States Geological Survey updated the assessment of mineral resources in the
Arctic Wildlife Refuge.156 The assessment, conducted pursuant to section
1002 of ANILCA, involved three years of study by dozens of scientists, and
used new technology to locate and predict the size of underground oil
reservoirs."5 7 The report is the latest study on the potential for oil exploration
in the ANWR."' The study concluded that there was a higher probability of
a larger oil reserve under the Refuge than originally thought just a decade
... See id. at 1.
"56 U.S. Geological Survey, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 1002 Area, Petroleum
Assessment, 1998, Including Economic Analysis, USGC Fact Sheet FS-028-01 (Apr. 2001),
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0028-O1/ [hereinafter Petroleum Assessment). The
introduction to the report explains why the assessment was done:
Since completion of [the 1987] report, numerous wells have been drilled
and oil fields discovered near ANWR, new geologic and geophysical data
have become available, seismic processing and interpretation capabilities
have improved, and the economics of North Slope oil development have
changed significantly. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) commonly is
asked to provide the Federal Government with timely scientific
information in support of decisions regarding land management,
environmental quality, and economic and strategic policy. To do so, the
USGS must anticipate issues most likely to be the focus of policymakers
in the future. Anticipating the need for scientific information and
considering the decade-old perspective of the petroleum resource
estimates included in the 1987 Report to Congress, the USGS has
reexamined the geology of the ANWR 1002 area and has prepared a new
petroleum resource assessment.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
"' Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Resources, U.S. Geological Survey Petroleum Assessment
of the 1002 Area of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Hearing Before the Senate Energy
& Natural Res. Comm., 103d Cong. (July 23, 1998) (statements by Kenneth A. Boyd,
Director of Oil & Gas Dep't. and Dr. Thomas J. Casadevall, Director, U.S.G.S. Survey)
[hereinafter Petroleum Assessment Hearing].
"' The last study was completed in 1987. See LEIS, supra note 135.
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earlier.'59 The report's data, much like the data from the 1987 survey, has
been used by both opponents and proponents of drilling.
Since its earliest days, the ANWR has been recognized for its ecological
and wilderness value. Its history is marked by a clear intent to respect the
Arctic environment. Its potential for oil, however, makes it a valuable natural
resource and the argument for oil exploration is almost as old as the Refuge
itself.
V. THE DEBATE OVER DRILLING
The battle lines between those who oppose and those who support
drilling for oil in the ANWR are distinctly drawn. Those who support drilling
include the Bush Administration, Republican congressmen, oil companies,
and some Alaskan constituents."W Those who oppose consist mainly of
environmental groups and Democratic politicians. 6' Although several sepa-
rate arguments are made by each side, such as the prospects forjob creation,
this Note focuses on the question of drilling within the framework of national
security and the environment.
A. Pro-Drilling Forces
The Bush Administration and Republican legislators' central argument
is that it is necessary to drill for oil in the ANWR to reduce the nation's
dependence on Middle Eastern oil.'62 In an effort to head off criticism from
environmentalists, they consistently point to the belief that drilling can be
done in an environmentally safe manner with new technologies.' 63 Spencer
Abraham, the Secretary of Energy, testified that:
[W]e're working on a number of ways to increase domestic
oil production. Advanced technology for exploration and
development, for example, add to our oil reserves from new
'5 See Petroleum Assessment Hearing, supra note 157.
See Weigert, supra note 115, at 169.
161 See supra note 64 for background on environmental groups opposed to drilling in the
ANWR, including the Sierra Club, Defenders of Wildlife, Northern Alaska Environment
Center, and the Wilderness Society, to name a few.
161 See Weigert, supra note 115, at 172.
63 See id. But see Talk of the Nation, supra note 10. Senator Frank Murkowski has
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and existing oil fields every year .... [Our plan calls for
the use of the most advanced exploration and drilling tech-
nologies in a tiny, a remote portion of the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge known as ANWR to increase domestic
production in the future.'
The pro-drilling forces cite the 1987 Final Legislative Impact Statement
to prove that exploration can be done in an environmentally safe method. 65
Gale Norton, the Secretary of the Interior, has consistently defended the
interests of oil exploration and has said that the wildlife and wilderness of the
1002 Area will not be harmed substantially by the introduction of oil
drilling. 1
66
In addition to giving the perception that there will be minimal impact
on the environment in the Refuge, proponents for drilling frequently raise the
question of whether American military presence and intervention in other
countries is worth stabilizing world oil prices or supply from OPEC. They
argue that by increasing domestic oil supply from Alaska, the United States
will prevent the need to send American soldiers overseas to protect its
foreign oil supply.1 67 Current American foreign policy acknowledges the
repeatedly referred to the minimal impact drilling would have on the ANWR:
[O]ne of the things a lot of people forget is how small that footprint
[drilling infrastructure] is and how large ANWR is. ANWR is the size of
the state of South Carolina. It's 19 million acres. We've already taken
three-quarters of it and put it into wilderness or refuge, leaving a million
and a half acres, and that million and a half acres is what would be open
if ANWR were open. And the footprint is estimated to be 2,000 acres out
of, you know, 19 million acres.
Id.; NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 55, at xiii, xiv. The National Energy Policy hails
technological advances that have made oil exploration and production more environmentally
safe. Current oil production needs far fewer rigs and less drilling then it once did. With
today's technology, one oil drilling site can drill oil deposits up to six miles away thus
leaving the environment unharmed. Id.




" See generally LEIS, supra note 135 (reporting that developing the 1002 Area would have
neglible effects on the environment).
" See Michael Grunwald, Departmental Differences Show Over ANWR Drilling.- Interior's
Norton Rebuffs Wildlife Service in Senate Testimony, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at A3.
167 See Talk of the Nation, supra note 10. Senator Frank Murkowski echoed Senator
Hatfield's statement: "I'll vote for opening the ANWR and decreasing our dependence on
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importance of securing Kuwaiti, Saudi Arabian and now Iraqi oil fields
through continued military presence in those countries.' 68
The need for foreign oil creates other problems beyond stationing troops
on foreign soil. It is frequently called to the public's attention that the United
States imported oil from Iraq during the 1990s at a time when we were
practically at war with them.'69 Money for imported Iraqi oil went straight
into Saddarn Hussein's treasury. Perversely, the American thirst for oil was
actually funding its enemies. Even more disturbing is that anti-American oil
producing nations are not the only ones who prosper from American oil
dependency. Advocates of drilling point to the sobering reality that terrorism
is undoubtedly funded by American money going to purchase oil from
abroad. 7 ' One example of this: Osama Bin Laden's multi-million dollar
wealth, and the financial backing of Al-Qaeda, came from his father's
construction business that made its fortune during the Arabian oil boom.'7'
Those who support drilling suggest that the oil in the 1002 Area of the
ANWR can replace the oil imported from unfriendly states.'72 The results of
the 1998 USGS Resource Assessment show there could be great amounts of
untapped oil beneath the ANWR. In a hearing before the Senate, Dr. Thomas
J. Casadevall, Acting Director of the Interior, and Kenneth Boyd, Director
of the Alaska Division of Oil and Gas, explained the results of the survey to
the Energy and Natural Resources Committee.'73 Boyd said "[t]he latest
USGS estimates confirm what geoscientists have been saying for years. The
1002 area [sic] holds extremely high promise for finding commercial
petroleum deposits. This is great news for Alaska and great news for the
Nation."'7
4
Pro-drilling forces believe the newest estimates of oil underneath the
ANWR prove the value of drilling there for energy and national security.'75
imported oil any day rather than send another American man or woman overseas to fight a
war on foreign soil over oil." Id.
168 See Sandhaus, supra note 47, at 48.
169 See Bryner, supra note 27.
70 See Mayer, supra note 84, at 638-40.
'71 See Greg Easterbrook, Why This War is Also About Oil, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 2001, at
15.
"'
72 For example, in 2002, the United States imported about 750,000 billion barrels of oil per
day from Iraq. See ENERGY REVIEW 2001, supra note 20, at 133.
7aSee Petroleum Assessment Hearing, supra note 157 (statement of Thomas J. Casadevall).
"' Id. (statement of Kenneth Boyd).
The increase in the projected size of oil deposits in the 1002 Area from the 1987 study
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By combining the size of the potential oil fields, the negligible effect oil pro-
duction will have on the ANWR, and the requirements of national security,
the Bush Administration and its allies have decided that drilling in the 1002
Area is a central part of the solution to ending our oil dependency.
B. Anti-Drilling Forces
For environmentalists, the conclusion is a simple one: oil drilling and
wilderness cannot co-exist. Although both sides concur that the actual extent
of environmental damage to the ANWR is unknown, it is virtually certain
that oil exploration in the Coastal Plain will have some detrimental effect on
the environment.'76 Some environmentalists argue that the "wilderness"
designation must be extended to the 1002 Area to protect it from the oil
industry.' Once the ANWR Coastal Plain is designated "wilderness," it
would be protected from any kind of industrial or commercial encroach-
ment."'8 Environmentalists argue that only by designating the area as
wilderness will the fate of the ANWR be secured.
79
Additionally, opponents point to the futility of reducing dependence on
foreign oil by drilling in the ANWR:
The myth is that we can drill our way out of dependency....
Underlying the logic of the [Bush energy plan's] supply side
approach is the fantasy that we can significantly reduce our
reliance on imported oil simply by bringing more domestic
production online. Simply saying that increased domestic
was attributed to newer three-dimensional seismic technology. See id.
176 See Weigert, supra note 115, at 169.
i See H.R. 770, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 411, 107th Cong. (2001); Danny Eidson, Why
Congress Should Grant Wilderness Status to the CoastalPlain oftheArctic National Wildlife
Refuge, 8 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 79-80 (1999); see also National Energy Security: Hearing on
the National Energy Security Act of2001 Before the House Comm. on Res., 107th Cong. 80-
90 (2001) (statement ofAdam Kolton, Arctic Campaign Director, Alaska Wilderness League
stating that wilderness designation of the Coastal Plain will ensure that at least one portion
of Alaska's north slope will forever remain free from industrialization) [hereinafter Kolton
Statement].
'
7 8 See Eidson, supra note 177, at 79-80.
179 See sources cited supra note 177.
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drilling will reduce our dependence on foreign oil doesn't
make it so."0
Given the vast quantities of oil America consumes and the relatively
small amount of oil that will be extracted from the ANWR, conservationists
argue that the idea that development in the Refuge will decrease American
dependency on foreign oil is ridiculous."'1
Senator Lincoln Chaffee's (R-RI) position is representative of many
other senators opposed to opening the ANWR. He has said,
I am prepared to support a national energy policy that bal-
ances our energy needs with strong environmental protection.
Reducing our dependence on foreign oil is a national priority,
but should not come solely at the expense of our nation's
precious natural resources. . . . Allowing oil and gas
development in the coastal plain promises only short-term
benefits that may irreparably damage the wildlife values and
unique vitality of the Arctic Refuge.'82
Opponents further argue that developing an oil producing infrastructure
in the 1002 Area would take about a decade to actually produce any oil.'83
Anti-drilling advocates argue that the time is too long to give the United
States any advantage. Rather, there are numerous other sources of oil that
the United States has only begun to tap, such as Russia, Mexico and West
o Facts and Myths, supra note 101 (statement of Tom Lantos, House Representative).
'
8 See Eidson, supra note 177, at 62-68; Kolton Statement, supra note 177. "Peak production
associated with a technically recoverable resource of 5.0 billion barrels (billion bbls) at the
faster development rate would be 750,000 bbls per day. U.S. petroleum consumption is about
19 million bbls per day." CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 5 (emphasis added).
112 148 CONG. REC. S3160 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2002) (statement of Senator Chafee).
's See CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 5.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated that at a relatively
fast development rate, production would peak 15-20 years after the start
of development, with maximum daily production rates of roughly 0.00015
(0.015%) of the resource. Production associated with the slower rate
would peak about 25 years after the start of development at a daily rate
equal to about 0.000105 (0.0105%) of the resource.
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Africa.'84 The opponents to drilling submit that it would be a more cost-
effective use of time and money to develop these sources instead of ruining
the Refuge.8
5
In addition to arguing that the reserves in the 1002 Area amount to no
more than a drop in the bucket of American oil demand, opponents vigor-
ously advance the alternative idea of increasing fuel efficiency for passenger
vehicles.8 6 Supporters of higher mandatory mile per gallon standards for
automobiles cite that increasing the average fuel economy of American cars
and sport utility vehicles to thirty-nine miles per gallon would save fifteen
times the amount of oil that the Coastal Plain might yield. 8 7 Other proposals
include requiring replacement tires that are of equal quality as new tires
which could save more oil than the Arctic refuge might hold.' 8
The variety of options available to policymakers leads environmentalists
to conclude that drilling in the ANWR is not the best choice, given
alternative measures.
C. Recent Developments in the Debate
A total of six bills came before the 107th Congress that would have
affected the future of the Refuge. Four of these bills would have opened the
ANWR to drilling. Two bills would have designated it as "wilderness." Only
' See Facts and Myths, supra note 101, at 45-53 (statement of Daniel Yergin, Chairman,
Cambridge Energy Research Associates).
185 See Eidson, supra note 177, at 62-66.
186 148 CONG. REC. S2906 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2002) (statements of Senator Nelson). Senator
Nelson raised the issue,
[I]f we don't ever address the enormous consumption of energy in the cars
that we drive, then we will remain dependent on all that foreign oil. There
is an easy way to do that, and that is to use this beneficence of American
ingenuity called technology and apply it to the problem and increase the
miles per gallon in our automobiles and SUVs and light trucks, which we
can do so well.
Id.
IS7 See Kolton Statement, supra note 177; see also NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note
55, at xii (directing the Secretary of Transportation to recommend CAFE standards based on
a study released by the National Academy of Sciences). The Policy recognizes the
importance of gas mileage standards even though it advocates the expansion of domestic oil
supply. Id. For a discussion of CAFE standards, see infra notes 242-49 and accompanying
text.
188 See Kolton Statement, supra note 177. Kolton's statement was endorsed by the Alaska
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H.R. 4, a comprehensive energy bill, had serious action taken. The House
sent the bill, which would have allowed drilling in the ANWR, to the Senate
by a vote of 240 to 189 in August 2001."9 By April 2002, the Senate sided
with the environmentalists and passed their version of the energy bill
refusing to allow exploration for oil in the Coastal Plain. 9 The bill was sent
on to conference where conferees tried unsuccessfully to reconcile the many
differences between the two bills.' 9' Representative Don Young (R-AK)
quickly picked up where the 107th Congress left off and introduced H.R. 39
on January 7, 2003.'92 The bill "establish[es] and implement[s] a competitive
oil and gas leasing program that will result in an environmentally sound and
job creating program for the exploration, development and production of
the oil and gas resources of the Coastal Plain, and for other purposes."' 93
Congressional leaders have stated in the opening days of the 108th Congress
that this will be a key piece of legislation and will be the pivotal debate over
the future of American energy policy. 94 President Bush continues to support
ANWR development as a vital part of his national energy security strategy.
VI. Do AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS REQUIRE DRILLING
IN THE ANWR?
There can be little doubt that the war in Iraq and the post-September
11 th "war on terrorism" represent major shifts in the focus and definition of
American foreign and domestic policy.'95 This shift is accompanied by the
threat created by American dependence on oil. Hopes for peace will be great-
ly enhanced if the United States can reduce its dependence. Since peace is
obviously the goal, reducing dependence on oil necessarily follows. The
decision whether to drill for oil in the ANWR comes down to striking a
Center for the Environment, the Alaska Conservation Alliance, the Alaska Chapter of
Sierra Club, Trustees for Alaska and the Alaska Coalition. Id. at 82.
9 See CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 3.
9 WilliamNeikirk, Senate Gives OK to Energy Measure; Passage Sets up Conference Fight
Over House Bill, CHI. TREB., Apr. 26, 2002, at 8.
' 9See CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 4.
92 Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Energy Security Act of 2003, H.R. 39, 108th Cong. (2003).
'9' Id. at 1.
'94 See CORN ET AL., supra note 71, at 1.
195 See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 91 (declaring a new doctrine
of preemption and the willingness to act alone if necessary against terrorists and enemy
nations).
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balance between conservation of the wilderness, the American need for oil,
and from where that oil will come. Is increasing domestic oil production the
nation's primary energy challenge, and does that mean the ANWR is the
answer?
The reality is threefold. First, the United States does not possess a large
amount of the world's oil reserves; it is estimated at around three percent of
the world's total.'96 Second, the majority of the world's oil reserves are found
in the Middle East.'9 7 Third, the American demand for oil is increasing by
1.7% annually.' 98 The United States will therefore continue to import a
greater amount of oil from the Middle East in the coming years. This trend
began years ago and will continue. 99 Two things are certain: there is nothing
the United States can do to change the geographic location of oil reserves,
and the disparity between American supply and American demand for oil
will increase.2"°
A. Freeing America From Dependence
The American thirst for oil is inevitably intertwined with national
security. Oil is vital to the economy, and it perpetuates the conflicts that
threaten national security. The first point is obvious, without a steady supply
of crude oil the nation would come to a standstill. The second point is more
subtle. The need for oil forces the United States to deploy troops to protect
oil interests, which in turn sows the seeds of hatred towards American
foreign policy, which eventually forces the United States to deploy more
troops in more areas. 20 1 The need for oil pushes the United States to tolerate
societies that breed hate towards America and create the incubators for
tomorrow's terrorists. 2 The possibility, if not probability, that American
196 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ANNUAL 2001
at 111-13 (2001), available at http://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/pdf/international/0484.pdf
(recording of data for all the world's countries oil reserves) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY ANNUAL].
197 Id.
19 See ENERGY OUTLOOK 2003, supra note 7, at 32.
199 Id.
200 Id.
20! See Mayer, supra note 84, at 635-43.
202 d.
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money for OPEC oil ultimately finances terrorist groups is a grim reminder
that dependency on oil has deadly consequences.23
Lessening the dependence on oil is a critical step towards better national
security and global peace. How to get there is the difficult part. Until an
equally efficient source of energy is found to replace petroleum, the stark
realities of the oil trade give the United States few options. America can
increase its domestic-and therefore reliable and safe-supply, it can
decrease demand, or it can do both. Relying wholly on increasing domestic
supply to fill the gap is unrealistic, therefore the only real choices are the
latter two options. The wiser and more efficacious route is to do both, reduce
demand and increase supply from non-OPEC sources. But what should have
greater importance, demand or supply?
B. Increasing Domestic Supply
The National Energy Policy clearly gives priority to increasing supply
and claims that any chance of meaningfully increasing domestic oil pro-
duction depends on opening the ANWR to exploration. 2' The results of the
1998 USGS Survey raise the hope of discovering huge oil fields underneath
the ANWR.2°5 But statistics can be deceiving. The data collected by the
USGS and other sources can be used by both sides of the debate to strengthen
their arguments. It is important to understand what the data means and
recognize when numbers are used to skew the conclusions in one party's
favor.
The study broke the oil reserve numbers into three categories: in-place
oil, technically recoverable oil, and economically recoverable oil.2 6 In-place
oil is the "amount of petroleum contained in accumulations ... without
regard to recoverability."2 7 Technically recoverable oil is the "volume of
petroleum representing that proportion of assessed in-place resources that
may be recoverable using current recovery technology without regard to
203 Id.
204 See generally NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 55 (explaining the energy
challenges facing the United States).
205 See Petroleum Assessment, supra note 156.
206 id.
207 Id. at 4.
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cost."2 8 Economically recoverable oil is the "part of the technically recover-
able resource for which the costs of discovery, development, and production,
including a return to capital, can be recovered at a given well-head price. 2 °9
The study computed a range of probabilities of finding X amount of
oil.2 0 According to the study, technically recoverable oil within the 1002
Area is estimated to be between 4.3 and 11.8 billion barrels of oil with an
average assessment of 7.7 billion barrels of oil.21 ' This number can be
misleading, because what counts is the economically recoverable oil
estimate. Using a baseline price of $24 per barrel, USGS estimated that there
was a mean value of 5.2 billion barrels of economically recoverable oil.2' 2
Depending on the price of oil, the number of recoverable barrels of oil will
fluctuate.2' 3 Additionally, as technology changes so too can the number of
economically recoverable barrels.
14
The numbers in this study are important because both sides tend to
manipulate them to their liking. Proponents of the national energy policy can
use the high end of the technologically recoverable oil figures because 11.8
billion barrels of untapped oil looks better than the lower end of economi-
cally recoverable estimates. In contrast, opponents of the energy plan can
respond by saying that if all the oil in the ANWR were used it would only
give the country enough oil for six months.2 5 That would be true only if the
United States relied solely on oil from the ANWR with no importation of oil,
which is obviously not what the drilling forces have in mind.
The inescapable fact is that a large amount of oil is located in the
ANWR. Taking the USGS baseline example, one can expect around 7.7
billion barrels of oil beneath the ANWR.2 6 EIA has predicted, using the
mean estimates of available resources, that opening the ANWR to crude oil
208 Id.
209 Id. at 7.210 d. at 4.
2 See Petroleum Assessment Hearing, supra note 157, at 7 (statement of Doctor Thomas J.
Casadevall, Acting Director, U.S. Geological Survey).
212 See Petroleum Assessment, supra note 156, at 6.
213 See Petroleum Assessment Hearing, supra note 157, at 7 (statement of Casadevall).
214 See generally id. at 9-16 (statement of Kenneth A. Boyd, Director, Division of Oil and
Gas, Department of Natural Resources, State of Alaska) (discussing three-dimensional
seismic data and effects of other technological developments).
215 See Weigert, supra note 115, at 173 (quoting the National Resources Defense Council's
Energy Policy for 2001).2
,' See Petroleum Assessment Hearing, supra note 157, at 7 (statement of Casadevall).
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development will add 800,000 barrels per day to American oil production in
2020, nine years after ANWR is projected to begin production." 7 This
increase in production is projected to reduce the net share of foreign oil
consumed by the United States from sixty-two percent to sixty percent, and
will increase domestic production by fourteen percent.218
If the oil fields under the ANWR did contain 7.7 billion barrels of oil,
then it would be one of the larger oil fields in the United States. By
comparison, the Prudhoe Bay oil field-the largest discovered in the United
States-contains 13 billion barrels of oil, and the estimated recoverable oil
from the lower forty-eight states is 136 billion barrels.219 Despite the possible
size of the ANWR oil fields, there still remains great uncertainty regarding
the size of those oil fields, the costs of developing those resources, the timing
of production and the environmental effects of drilling.20
The only certainty is that opening the ANWR for drilling will have only
marginal effects on reducing dependency on foreign oil. Even in the best case
scenarios, oil extracted from the ANWR cannot win American independence
from oil imported from the Persian Gulf.
Fundamentally, the linkage between American dependence for oil and
national security is so important that it should make drilling in the ANWR
a priority, unless there are better alternatives. Given the marginal effects oil
drilling in the ANWR will have on mitigating American demand for foreign
oil, there are better choices available. The question is not whether the United
States should sacrifice national security for the sake of 1.5 million acres of
Arctic tundra, but whether drilling is necessary for national security given
alternate measures, concern for the conservation of the ANWR and to a
larger extent, the remaining public lands.
C. Alternatives to Drilling
Historically, America has recognized the importance of the environment
by passing laws to protect it.22' This interest in conserving public lands was
2"' ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE EFFECTS OF THE ALASKA OIL AND




220 Id. at 12.
221 See, e.g., The Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977); The Clean Air Act
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written into law in the Wilderness Act of 1964.222 More than seventy-five
areas located in sixty-three wildlife refuges have been granted wilderness
designation. 223 Along with the Refuge Recreation Act of 1962 and the
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Acts of 1966 and 1997, the
Wilderness Act demonstrates a clear commitment to protect the natural
ecosystems.224 All of those acts support protecting wilderness areas such as
the Arctic Refuge Coastal Plain.225 Specifically, President Eisenhower's Pub-
lic Land Order recognized the public's interest in "preserving unique wild-
life, wilderness and recreational values" when he established the ANWR.
2 26
The ANWR is valuable as a complete and intact arctic ecosystem.
Before deciding to explore for oil in its "biological heart' 227 the nation must
look at alternatives that might be more environmentally friendly and
effective.228
1. Other Sources of Supply
There are sources of oil from "safe" countries that the United States has
barely begun to tap. While it would take about seven to twelve years for oil
production to begin in the ANWR, 29 the fastest growing sources for oil pro-
duction are the Caspian states, Africa and Russia.23 ° The United States could
promote greater diversified production of oil from these more reliable and
("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1970); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1969).
222 Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577 (1964). The Act provides the procedure for
declaring an area a "wilderness." Once land receives "wilderness" status, the construction
ofbuildings and/or roads in the area is forbidden. Recreational uses are allowed. The act was
intended to keep certain areas pristine and safe from outside exploitation. See Eidson, supra
note 22, at 216 (stating the Act was a legislative struggle that took over nine years and sixty-
five revisions).
223 Eidson, supra note 22, at 216-17.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Public Land Order 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598, 12,598 (Dec. 8, 1960); see also Kolton
Statement, supra note 177 (arguing that drilling in the ANWR would undermine the
environmental progress begun under President Eisenhower).
227 See Eidson, supra note 22, at 212.
228 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 369-71.
229 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 217, at 4.
230 See Facts and Myths, supra note 101 (statement ofAlan Larson, Undersecretary for Econ-
omic, Business and Agricultural Affairs).
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friendly countries. Initiating closer ties with Russia's energy industry and
developing oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea are other options available to
the Bush administration.2 3' By diversifying supply from non-OPEC nations,
the United States can reduce its dependency on oil from unfriendly countries
without needing to produce oil from the ANWR.2 32
2. New Technology
There are new technologies that are already in place or will be in the not
too distant future that will reduce the need for new oil exploration. New oil
recovery technology and exploration of oil fields in the Alaskan North
Slope233 are allowing greater amounts of oil recovery in areas already
developed for drilling."3 Advanced recovery technology has the ability to
extend the life of existing oil fields. For example, in 1990, the American
Petroleum Institute determined that the Prudhoe Bay oil field was depleted,
but due to the use of improved oil recovery technology, this "depleted" field
was producing 855,000 billion barrels per day by 1996.235 It is now expected
to produce oil until 2030.236 Application of emerging technology could boost
production of Alaskan oil without drilling in the ANWR.237
New technologies are quickly emerging, such as hydrogen-powered
automobiles and fuel-cells, that might one day reduce the consumption of
petroleum.238 Auto companies such as Ford, General Motors, Toyota and
Daimler-Chrysler are all developing fuel-cell cars and are planning to
introduce them to the market by 2005.239 Hybrid vehicles such as Honda's
231 See id. at 18.
232 See id. at 45-47 (statements ofDaniel Yergin, Cambridge Energy Research Associates and
Stuart Eizenstat, former deputy Secretary of the Treasury).
233 The North Slope is the northern region in Alaska where Prudhoe Bay and the National
Petroleum Reserve is located.
234 See Kolton Statement, supra note 178.
235 Eidson, supra note 177, at 78 (citation omitted).
236 Id. (Citation omitted).
237 See id. at 78-79.
238 See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003) ("proposing
$1.2 billion in research funding so that America can lead the world in developing clean,
hydrogen-powered automobiles"), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/01/20030128-19.htnl [hereinafter State of the Union 2003].
131 See Marianne Lavelle, Living Without Oil, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 17, 2003, at
32, 35.
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Civic and Toyota's Prius are already on the market. 240 The FreedomFUEL
initiative, a scientific research program launched by President Bush, focuses
on developing what is unquestionably the most promising alternative fuel
source-hydrogen.24' Scores of firms as well as major petroleum companies
are researching how to make hydrogen powered cars a reality.242 The govern-
ment can continue to search for a long-term solution to petroleum use by
increasing support for alternative fuel sources without allowing oil explor-
ation in the ANWR.
3. CAFE Standards
Perhaps the quickest and single-most effective alternative to oil
exploration in the ANWR is raising the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
("CAFE") standards. Raising these standards would make automobiles more
fuel efficient and save millions of barrels of oil per day.243 Senators Diane
Feinstein (D-CA) and Gordon Smith (R-OR) attempted unsuccessfully to
pass legislation in May 2001 that would increase mandatory miles per gallon
("mpg") for light trucks, SUVs, and mini-vans to 27.5 mpg by 2007.2"
Similar legislation was introduced in early 2002 that would have increased
CAFE standards to 36 mpg by 2015 for SUVs and mini-vans.245 Despite
these efforts, Congress has consistently killed these attempts and any other
legislation that would attempt to curb gasoline usage by Americans.246
The administration has repeatedly held that the American standard of
living should not be sacrificed for higher gas mileage.247 Critics of gas
24 01 d. at 37.
241 Id. at 35.
... See id. Firms like British Petroleum and Royal Dutch/Shell Group have invested billions
of dollars into hydrogen projects. See also Eidson, supra note 177, at 76-77.
243 See COMM. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS & IMPACT OF CORP. AVERAGE FUEL ECON.
STANDARDS, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS 1-3 (2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/ 0309076013/html. The report was a comprehensive investigation
into CAFE standards. The study estimates that roughly 2.8 million barrels of oil per day
would be used in the absence of CAFE standards. Id.
24 Bryner, supra note 27, at 353.
14 Mayer, supra note 84, at 622.
146 See William Newkirk, Senate Gives OK to Energy Measure; Passage Sets Up Conference
Fight over House Bill, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 2002, at 8.
247 See Bryner, supra note 27, at 359-60.
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mileage standards point to vehicle safety among other arguments for not
accepting higher standards.248 If Americans would accept higher standards
for automobiles, however, the United States would be much less dependent
on oil. Furthermore, auto manufacturers can increase gas mileage using
existing technologies.2 49 A National Academy of Science study found that
new technology, some of it already in use, could improve gas mileage by
twenty-five to fifty percent.250 It seems disingenuous for our government to
ask American service members to make sacrifices in the Persian Gulf, and
then refuse to raise gas mileages on SUVs here at home. Legislating new
CAFE standards could save more oil than we could ever hope to extract from
the 1002 Area of the ANWR.
4. Fundamental Changes
Fundamentally, the debate over the ANWR goes deeper than just the
conservation of a national refuge versus exploitation of federal land. The
debate is about difficult choices we as Americans will be forced to make
today or in the future. Despite the significance of American dependency on
oil and the enormous repercussions this dependency can have, no one in the
government has attempted to confront the tougher issues. The American
lifestyle will have to change if Americans are ever to be free of oil depen-
dency. Despite this, no one has asked Americans to drive less or buy more
fuel efficient cars. No one has proposed taxing gasoline at higher rates.
Instead, Congress has continually rejected legislation to increase minimum
gas mileage requirements for vehicles. While this Note does not advocate any
particular solution, the fact remains that a permanent long-term solution can
only come when the government gives serious deliberations to the domestic
demand for oil.
President George W. Bush said in his State of the Union Address that
Americans would not leave their problems to future generations.25" ' Essen-
248 But see Mayer, supra note 84, at 624 (stating that the argument that consumers should be
able to purchase larger, safer vehicles is weakened by evidence that shows SUVs are not
safer and the auto industry's own failure to fully disclose safety statistics for SUVs).
249 See Lavelle, supra note 239.
250 Id. at 35. Raising the miles per gallon standard to 35 mpg would save 1.5 million bbls of
oil per day, more than the most optimistic estimate of production in the ANWR. See Bryner,
supra note 27, at 371.
2S See State of the Union 2003, supra note 238.
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tially, that is what will happen by developing the ANWR. Instead of meeting
the real challenge, over consumption of oil, America merely puts off the
problem until tomorrow. The debate over the ANWR boils down to choosing
the easy solution over the difficult solution.
Oil pumped from the Coastal Plain of the ANWR is not vital to our
national security. There are other measures which would accomplish the
results of opening the ANWR in less time, such as higher mileage standards
for vehicles, newer technology in existing oil fields, and importing from
friendlier states. The bottom line is that the United States, at its current
consumption rates, will always be reliant on foreign produced oil. It is time
for America to handle its dependency on oil by addressing what it con-
trols--demand for oil-and not try and drill the way to freedom.
VII. CONCLUSION
Sacrificing one of America's greatest wilderness areas in lieu of the
available alternatives is a poor bargain and futile solution. It is impossible
for the United States to increase domestic production to a point where we
will be independent from Middle East oil. Our dependency is and will be a
constant in our national security equations. The best approach the United
States can take is to reduce demand for oil and increase supply from other
existing sources. A reduction in demand can come from higher gas mileage
standards, but at a more fundamental level, it has to come from a determined
change in lifestyles of the average American.252 This is the difficult part.
Americans must realize that lower gasoline prices and bigger cars come at
a price. The price is the blood of our citizens and the destruction of our
environment. There may come a day when the oil underneath the ANWR
is actually vital to our nation's security. Today with the number of viable
alternatives available to the country, it would be regretful if we chose the
least attractive and most destructive.
252 See Mayer, supra note 84, at 641.
If more and more members of the U.S. motoring public were to voluntarily
use less gasoline, and if as citizens they supported higher gasoline taxes,
stricter fuel economy standards, and the phase out of subsidies for oil and
its related industries, the United States would be less dependent on oil
generally, and Persian Gulf oil in particular.
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Most recently, the debate in the 108th Congress for the future of the
ANWR came to a head on March 19, 2003, when the Senate narrowly voted
against drilling in the Refuge by a vote of 52 to 48.253 The vote followed two
days of passionate debate with both sides offering statistics and speeches to
support their perspective. Republican leaders had expressed hopes that this
would be the year to force the provision through Congress.254
The fight of the decade continues.
253 David Firestone, Drilling in Alaska, A Priority for Bush, Fails in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2003, at A29.
254 Id.
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